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BRICS (the group composed by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) just 
recently completed 10 years of existence. However, despite representing a symbolic anniversary 
for this multi-continental political association whose inception was prompted by 2008’s Financial 
Crisis, observers in the West affirm that «the differences between […] [BRICS members] remain 
considerably greater than their similarities»1, thus questioning the group’s cohesion as an 
important factor in world politics and even its survival in the foreseeable future. The present 
research then sets out to investigate not only BRICS’s view on international relations (IR), but also 
its compatibility with the national interests and political positions of two of its members, Brazil 
and Russia, when considered individually.  
As far as analyses of BRICS documents are concerned, it is possible to highlight the 
following points concerning the group’s view about IR: 
• The world should be Multipolar, without any form of Superpower dominance 
within the system and global politics defined by different centers of economic, political and 
civilizational influence. 
• The world order should be based on the rule of international law and traditional 
mechanisms of global governance become more representative of current day’s realities, 
considering the increasing role of emerging economies. 
•  The architecture of financial governance should be reformed in order to empower 
developing economies, thus responsibilities and voting power at institutions such as the World 
Bank and especially the IMF should be rearranged.  
With the aforementioned points in mind, our Research Question is then constituted 
as follows: “Does BRICS views on the current state of global governance and the emergence of 
multipolarity in world affairs coincide with Brazil’s and Russia’s national interests and aspirations 
in the system”? At first glance, Brazil and Russia do share some interesting similarities. During 
the early 2000s, both countries witnessed changes in their international status reflecting their 
economic growth, followed by - or concomitantly with - new leaders and political parties coming 
to power in those States, as in the cases of Vladimir Putin in Russia and the Labor Party’s 
government in Brazil.  
 
1 Lieber, R.J. Retreat and its Consequences: American Foreign Policy and the problem of World Order. New York: 




Both also occupy a similar space in international trade as importers of manufactured 
goods (23% of Brazil’s imports in 2017 were composed by machines2, while the latter accounted 
for 30% of Russia’s imports in the same year3), and providers of commodities to global markets 
(58% of Russia’s exports in 2017 were composed by mineral products, especially oil4, while 
mineral products accounted for 20% of all Brazilian exports, particularly oil and iron ore5). Beyond 
their international trade profile, Brazil and Russia are also identified as ‘continent-countries’, due 
to their territory-size, alongside other States such as China, Australia, US, Canada and India. 
Moreover, the size of their populations and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) are relatively 
comparable, and both States have abundance of natural resources6. 
Nevertheless, although sharing a number of similarities, the proposed Research also 
tackles Brazil’s and Russia’s differences in terms of political status and aspirations in the 
international system, once their views on the current state of Global Governance and their 
understanding about concepts such as multipolarity derive from their self-perception within the 
system. Brazil, on the one hand, is overall not recognized as a ‘Great Power’, in the sense of being 
a State whose economic, political and military might enables it «to exert power over world 
diplomacy»7 while bearing ‘special responsibilities’ in the management of systemic affairs8. 
Moreover, the country «has never been able to match its territorial assets with military or economic 
might»9, which can be illustrated by the fact that although being the 5th biggest country in terms 
of territory (with roughly 5.6 % of the world’s landmass)10, Brazil is only the 9th largest economy 
by GDP (with 2.09 % of the world’s total), and devoid of nuclear weapons11. Brazil, nevertheless, 
 
2 Observatory of Economic Complexity. What does Brazil import? (2017). URL: 
<https://oec.world/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/bra/all/show/2017/> 
3 Observatory of Economic Complexity. What does Russia import? (2017). URL: 
<https://oec.world/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/rus/all/show/2017/> 
4 Observatory of Economic Complexity. What does Brazil export? (2017). URL: 
<https://oec.world/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/bra/all/show/2017/> 
5 Observatory of Economic Complexity. What does Russia export? (2017). URL: 
<https://oec.world/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/rus/all/show/2017/> 
6 Leite, A.C.C; Lucena, A.M.M; Nobre, F.R.F. Russia’s Geopolitics in the Anglo-American region: foreign policy 
and strategic alliance with Brazil (2005 and 2017). Rev. Bras. Est. Def. v. 6, nº 1, jan./jun. 2019 
7 Flemes, D. O Brasil na iniciativa BRIC: soft balancing numa ordem global em mudança? Revista Brasileira de 
Políica Internacional, 2010, Vol. 53 (1), p.2 
8 Waltz, K. N. Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979 
9 Casarões, G. Itamaraty’s Mission: Brazil’s Ministry of External Relations, a Pillar of the Nation, Struggles Toward 
a “Democratic” Foreign Policy. Cairo Review, 2014, Vol 12, pp. 88-89. URL: 
<https://www.thecairoreview.com/essays/itamaratys-mission/> 
10 WORLDOMETER. Largest Countries in the World (by area). URL: 
<https://www.worldometers.info/geography/largest-countries-in-the-world/> 
11 Brazil became signatory of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean 
(a.k.a The Treaty of Tlatelolco) of 1967 and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1998, thus excluding the possibility 




alongside other Regional Powers (such as India) believe «that the size of their territory and 
population, economic and military potentials […] [indeed] qualify them for a higher status in the 
international system»12, thus explaining the country’s claim for a bigger voice in world affairs.  
Russia, on the other hand, has been considered a Great Power since at least the end of 
the Napoleonic Wars in the 19th century, to the point of being labelled by other continental powers 
of the time as the “gendarme of Europe”13. Later in the 20th century, within the frameworks of the 
Soviet Union (USSR), the country managed to develop an impressive nuclear arsenal, thus 
achieving strategic parity with the United States during the Cold War, a condition that, among 
other things, elevated Moscow’s status to that of a Superpower.  
The Relevance of the aforementioned task, beyond attesting whether BRICS positions 
are in fact compatible with Brazil’s and Russia’s views about world affairs and global governance, 
is also reinforced by the necessity to assess BRICS cohesion as a political group really 
representative of its member-States aspirations. The Novelty of the present research consists in 
contrasting Brazil-Russia’s positions while within BRICS with both countries’ views, when taken 
individually, on issues ranging from the reform of today’s structures of Global Governance to their 
understanding of multipolarity. The Purpose of the thesis is to compare the positions of Russia 
and Brazil, while within the frameworks of their BRICS cooperation, with their national interests 
and views in order to determine whether this interrelation is characterized by full compatibility or 
divergence. 
The Object of the research is BRICS itself (discussed in Chapter 2), while our Subject 
is represented by Brazil’s and Russia’s positions in regard to their views on the global governance 
system and multipolarity (discussed in Chapter 3).  
Our main Tasks in order to attain our purpose are described as follows: 
• (1) To characterize global tendencies and views about the current state of 
Global Governance, the claims by emerging powers for more representation in world affairs and 
BRICS role within this debate (Chapter 1).  
• (2) To demonstrate what BRICS declarations, reveal in terms of 
multipolarity, the reform of the Security Council and necessary changes to Bretton Woods 
institutions (Chapter 2) 
 
12 Sergunin, A. Theorizing BRICS: Critical Perspectives. In: International Legal Aspects of BRICS. Belo Horizonte, 
Brazil: Editora D’Plácido, 2019, p.115 





• (3) To present and evaluate Brazil’s and Russia’s positions on the topics 
highlighted in Task 2 (Chapter 3). 
• (4) To compare BRICS declarations to Brazil’s and Russia’s individual 
national interests, views and aspirations concerning the topics highlighted in Task 2 (Chapter 3). 
• (5) To infer from Task 4 whether BRICS opinions are compatible/divergent 
with Brazil’s and Russia’s positions on the topics highlighted in Task 2 (Conclusion) 
 
In terms of Methodology, we found to be best suited to answer our Research Question 
by using a qualitative/analytical approach to the investigation of documents (BRICS Summits’ 
Communiques, Foreign Policy Concepts, G4’s, IBSA’s and RIC’s declarations), and political 
discourses (by presidents, government officials and ministers) embedded within this thesis. 
Analyses of secondary sources include scholarly articles and opinion pieces from specialists on 
BRICS and on Brazilian and Russian foreign policies.  
As for a brief Literary Review on topics pertaining to our Research, the present study 
was based on works in English, Russian and Portuguese languages, comprising both Primary and 
Secondary sources. As for the positions of Brazil and Russia concerning the reform of the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC), we made use of, from the Brazilian side, declarations from 
government officials, previous Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Presidents14, alongside G4’s 
(group composed by Brazil, India, Japan and Germany) and IBSA’s communiques. Through those 
sources, Brazil evidences the necessity of a significant reform for the UNSC, in order to turn this 
mechanism more representative of the current realities of world politics.  
Secondary sources about Security Council reform include studies by Brazilian 
diplomats15, stating the necessity to turn the UNSC into a more representative organ by including 
countries from Latina America and Africa. From the Russian side, as primary sources, we relied 
mostly on declarations from officials and political figures16, as well as government documents 
substantiating Russia’s concern about the scope of a possible UNSC reform17, postulating that the 
current permanent-members shall not lose any of their prerogatives. BRICS positions on this 
matter were extracted from the group’s declarations, balancing at one side Brazil’s (as well as 
India’s) aspirations versus Russia’s (and China’s) concerns about keeping its status-quo at the 
UNSC. 
 
14 Such as Celso Amorim, Mauro Vieira, Jose Serra and Presidents Dilma Rousseff and Michel Temer 
15 Such as Law Professor Pedro Sloboda 
16 As Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and President Vladimir Putin 




On BRICS potential developments for the future, we made use of studies on the 
necessity to de-Westernize Global Governance; on BRICS’ role in providing space for emerging 
powers in world affairs we consulted writings discussing the increasing regionalization of world 
politics and the rise of a polycentric international order18.  On Brazil’s foreign policy goals and its 
pursuit for recognition in world affairs we relied upon works by Brazilian intellectuals and 
historians19. On Russian foreign policy and its recent developments, we made use of important 
observations made by Russianists, Russian thinkers and Russia-based IR Professors20. Concerning 
the necessity to reform the Bretton Woods institutions, we take into consideration as primary 
sources data on the evolution of Voting Share and Quota’s allocation from the IMF and reports by 
IMF specialists about the changes on voting power of the G7 and emerging economies over the 
years; Brazilian and Russian criticisms about the slow pace of IMF quota reform are found within 
declarations by government officials and former Presidents21. BRICS’ positions were once again 
extracted from the group’s summit documents since 2009, which insisted on the necessity to give 
more voice and responsibility to emerging powers in managing financial global affairs.  
Secondary sources on the necessity to reform Bretton Woods institutions include 
studies on the decline of Bretton Woods legitimacy by economist Luiz Gonzaga Belluzo, the 
decline of Western dominance in financial global governance by Amitav Acharya, and BRICS’ 
strategy in face of the such changes by analysts Daniel Flemes and Russian Professor Maria 
Lagutina. As for Brazil-Russia common advocacy of ‘multilateralism’ and 
‘multipolarity/polycentricity’ in IR, we found best suited to scrutinize governmental documents 
(such as Russia’s Foreign Policy Concepts), declarations by Ministers, political actors and 
diplomats (on the Brazilian side). The Conclusion, beyond assessments delineated in Task 5, will 
also encompass some of the study’s limitations as well as propose future lines of research. As for 
Chapter’s Structure, the first Chapter provides an analysis about the elements of the current 
system of Global Governance, the second Chapter discusses BRICS positions (the Object of the 
thesis), while the third and last Chapter scrutinizes Russia’s and Brazil's points of view (our 
Subject) alongside its comparison with BRICS declarations. Thus, the overall Research’s path here 
undertaken will navigate from the Global (Chapter 1) to BRICS (Chapter 2) to the national 
(Chapter 3) levels of analysis.  
 
18 By specialists Amitav Acharya, Brazilianist Daniel Flemes, Brazil-based BRICS specialist Oliver Stuenkel and 
Professor Maria Lagutina 
19 e.g Rubens Barbosa, Eugenio Garcia, Tullo Vigevani, Gabriel Cepaluni, Professor Guilherme Casarões, etc.  
20 Names include Angelo Segrillo, Alexandr Dugin, Maria Lagutina, etc 
21 Such as Mauro Vieira (ex- Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs), former Brazilian president Dilma Rouseff, Sergey 





GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CURRENT 
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 
 
1.1 THE UNITED NATIONS, BRETTON WOODS AND SYSTEM 
POLARITY AFTER WORLD WAR II 
 
After the end of World War II (in 1945), numerous International Organizations (IOs) 
emerged on the world stage, consisting of different forms, aims and principles. Since then, the 
pillars of global security and financial governance were represented by the United Nations [UN] 
and the Bretton Woods institutions. The Post-War order was based on the principle of 
‘Multilateralism’, with countries working through international organizations on a rules-based 
cooperative framework, in order to mitigate the effects of power politics, as happened during the 
first half of the 20th century. 
The UN was created to foster cooperation and peaceful relations internationally in 
accordance with the principle of the ‘sovereign equality’ of States, while openly discouraging «the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence»22 of any of its 
members. Its General Assembly enjoyed universal membership, while based on a "one country, 
one vote" system.  
At the same time, however, the UN established a collective security framework 
through the United Nations Security Council [UNSC], with five designated powers (the United 
States [US], Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union and China) working as “permanent members” 
with veto power over any resolution proposed in the Council. The UNSC is up until now the only 
UN organ endowed with the «primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security»23, whose decisions are binding to all UN member States. All the 5 permanent 
members of the Council uphold a differentiated status vis-à-vis other UN members, since they 
concentrate decision-making about security matters of international significance. On this note, if 
in fact, as posited by Realists and Neorealists in International Relations’ [IR] Theory, «institutions 
are basically a reflection of the distribution of power in the world»24, thus it might be fair to state 
that the collective security mechanism established within the UN became a reflection of the 
 
22 UNITED NATIONS CHARTER. URL: <https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-charter-full-text/> Art 1º, 
1, 4 
23 ibidem, V, Art.24º 
24 Mearsheimer, J. The False Promise of International Institutions. International Security, Winter 1994/1995 (Vol. 19, 




designs of the victorious Allied Powers, represented by the United States, Great Britain and the 
Soviet Union.  
The Breton Woods institutions, on the other hand, were founded in 1944 (even prior to 
the UN itself) with the aim to avoid the economic perils that ravaged the international system 
during the interwar period (1919-1939), and include the World Bank (initially named the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) and the International Monetary Fund 
[IMF] as the back-bone of the financial structure of global governance, providing «a multilateral 
framework of rules»25 for the management of the international economy.  
Currently, the IMF is composed by 188 member countries that contribute to the 
organization by making available part of their international reserves. Thus, whenever necessary, 
the Fund can allocate resources, by means of loans, to help countries facing deficits at their balance 
of payments, provided that they fulfill certain requirements/criteria established by the IMF itself 
in order to reorganize their economy. Countries with the biggest number of quotas at the IMF are 
also the ones with the biggest Voting Shares and therefore, capable of influencing the institutions’ 
decisions and operations. The country with the biggest voting power at the IMF at the moment is 
the US, with 16.51% of the total vote’s share.  
Another branch of Bretton Woods, the World Bank has an organizational structure that 
also resembles that of the IMF, where voting power is distributed according to each country's 
participation as a guarantor of the Bank's capital. Currently, the countries with the biggest voting 
power are: the United States (with veto power in relation to any of the Bank’s decisions), Japan, 
China, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and India.  
In terms of system polarity, the international order during the whole of the Cold War 
(1947-1991) was effectively bipolar, with the Western alliance of States led by United States at 
one side and the Eastern alliance of States led by the Soviet Union at the other, both competing for 
supremacy globally. However, after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the world witnessed an 
undeniable and unchallenged American predominance, with the previously Bipolar world order 
suddenly changed to a Unipolar one based on the American hegemony. In fact, right after the end 
of the war, the privileged economical standing of the US vis-à-vis other European powers 
contributed to its leadership «in building a liberal international order […] which has had 
remarkable staying power over time»26, as commented by the Neorealist John Mearsheimer.  
 
25 Elias, J; Sutch, P. International Relations: The Basics. New York: Routledge, 2007, p.87 





Nevertheless, since early 2000s, many countries around the world started to oppose 
certain aspects of the American hegemony, in particular the unilateral militarism prevalent during 
George W. Bush’s administration (2001-2009), which, alongside the 2008 Financial Crisis also 
originated in the US, became important factors in bringing together emerging countries, willing to 
defend concepts such as ‘multilateralism’ in global affairs and the diplomatic (instead of militarist) 
solutions to acute international crises. 
Political scientists would write about the ‘end of Unipolarity’ «and with it the illusion 
that other nations would simply take their assigned place in a U.S.-led international order»27, which 
brings us to the current scenario discussed throughout our Research, an order characterized by an 
ascension of new powers. Nowadays, as argued by some, the United States is no longer able «to 
create the rules and dominate the institutions of global governance28 and world order in the manner 
it had for much of the post–World War II period»29, due to the rise of different centers of power 
within the system. Changes in the international distribution of economic and military power caused 
the so-called emerging States [or emerging economies] to play a more active role in world politics. 
The term ‘emerging’, by its turn, comes from the understanding that some States, once seen as 
‘peripheral’ within the system, have now improved their economic standing, elevating their status 
vis-à-vis traditionally established powers30. The next section will thus be dedicated to discussing 
emerging powers’ claim for more voice in global decision-making.  
 
1.2 CLAIMS BY EMERGING POWERS FOR MORE 
REPRESENTATION IN WORLD POLITICS 
 
By the 1970s, the basis of the Bretton Woods system had weakened and the liberal 
vision of international management led by the US and its Western allies started to instigate 
dissidence among less-developed countries of the globe, whose view was that the open monetary 
 
27 Allison, G. The New Spheres of Influence: Sharing the Globe with Other Great Powers. Foreign Affairs: 2020. 
URL: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-02-10/new-spheres-influence> 
28 The concept of Global Governance chosen for our Research is that of activities «backed by shared goals that may 
or may not derive from legal and formally prescribed responsibilities» as defined by Rosenau in 1992. Rosenau, J; 
Czempiel, E. Governance without government: order and change in world politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992 
29 Acharya, A. After Liberal Hegemony: The Advent of a Multiplex World Order. Ethics & International Affairs, 31, 
no. 3 (2017), p. 277. 
30 Lima, M.R A Política Externa Brasileira e os Desafios da Cooperação Sul-Sul. Revista Brasileira de Política 





and financial systems of global governance worked to perpetuate their underdevelopment and 
dependence to the developed countries31.  
In the 1980s developing nations in debt were pressured by industrialized States through 
the IMF making «international aid dependent on neoliberal-style adjustment measures […] 
[meaning] primarily reducing public spending […] privatization of State-owned enterprises; the 
floating of exchange rates; price decontrols; fighting inflation; and reducing tariff barriers on 
imports»32 policies which caused, collaterally, many countries to face acute economic domestic 
instability and eventually declare moratory on their debt.  
During the 1990s, multilateral institutions of global governance were under the 
uncontested leadership of the United States, which, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
experienced a Unipolar momentum, in a time where international analysts, such as Francis 
Fukuyama, announced triumphantly ‘The End of History’. The then so-called Washington 
Consensus, concerning fiscal discipline, market deregulation, privatization of State assets, 
financial and trade liberalization etc, had whole continents such as South America witness «less 
growth […] in per capita GDP than in 1950–80, despite the dismantling of the [previously] State-
led, populist, and protectionist policy regimes of the region»33, followed by economic depression, 
inflation and social instability in many countries.  
With the coming of the 21st century, however, the so-called emerging countries started 
to challenge the «framework that has underpinned the post-war order»34, seeking to improve their 
decision-making authority in various mechanisms of global governance. Due, in part, to the 
dramatic changes in the context of global development in recent decades, many emerging 
economies have industrialized and urbanized at a pace never seen before in human history35, and 
as a result, claims for a bigger voice and representation in the institutions created after World War 
II became a common place in world politics. In other words, «to reconfigure rights and 
responsibilities in existing institutions to reflect the diffusion of power in an increasingly 
multipolar world»36 should be the goal of the current order, affirms John Ikenberry.  
 
31 Tkachenko, S. International Political Economy. In: Tsvetkova, Natalia (Ed.), Russia and the World: Understanding 
International Relations, Lexington Books, 2017, pp.79-102 
32 ibidem 
33 Rodrik, Dani. Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion? A Review of the World Bank’s 
Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform. Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLIV 
(December 2006), pp. 973–987, p.975 
34 Acharya, A. After Liberal Hegemony: The Advent of a Multiplex World Order, p. 275.    
35 NEW DEVELOPMENT BANK. NDB’s General Strategy: 2017 – 2021. URL: <https://www.ndb.int/wp-
content/uploads/2017/08/NDB-Strategy.pdf> 




Today, both the UN system and the Bretton Woods institutions face acute problems of 
legitimacy, considered by many countries as being ‘too Western-centric’ (a critique especially 
directed towards the IMF and the World Bank) and unrepresentative of the current distribution of 
power (above all economic) in international affairs. For some analysts «the UN, the World Bank, 
and the IMF all work hard to legitimate themselves with claims for the moral virtue of what they 
do […] But when others doubt the intent and sincerity of these actors, accusations escalate from 
mere incompetence to deceit and hypocrisy»37, which has often being the case when it comes to 
many States’ grievances towards the somewhat unfair configuration of the international system. 
In addition to the aforementioned, we might as well add the limited mobility of States within the 
system and the difficulty of existing institutions to properly integrate emerging powers38 in their 
processes of decision-making.  
With the old US-led Post-War order giving way to a more multipolar configuration of 
power, some started to speak about a ‘crisis of transition’39, represented by new coalitions of States 
(such as BRICS) and new governance institutions (e.g the New Development Bank). In fact, after 
the Financial Crisis of 2008, not only globalization (in general), but also the financial governance 
of the system40 (in particular) started to be contested, prompting emerging economies to coordinate 
themselves in order to avoid further financial instability in the future. Russian professor Maria 
Lagutina affirms for instance that «the Financial Crisis laid the foundations for the transformation 
of the world order and the redistribution of power centers in its structure: from the North and the 
West to the East and the South»41, with the East and South represented by emerging and vibrant 
economies in Asia, Africa and Latin America.  
During the 2000s, moreover, rising non-western States began to claim for a greater 
voice in global governance42 mechanisms, making the overall system «less US and Western-
centric»43 and more representative of their augmented economic as well as political importance. 
While some affirmed that the decades-old traditional system of global governance suited in fact 
 
37 Finnemore, M. Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity: Why Being a Unipole Isn’t All 
It’s Cracked Up to Be. Princeton University: World Politics 61, no. 1 (January 2009), 58–85, p. 74 
38 Stuenkel, O. O Mundo Pós-Ocidental: Potências Emergentes e a Nova Ordem Global. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2018, 
1º Edição 
39   Ikenberry, G. J. The End Of Liberal International Order?, p. 8 
40Lagutina, M. L. BRICS in A World of Regions. URL: 
<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/23802014.2019.1643781?needAccess=true> 
41 Ibidem, p.5 
42 ibidem 
43 Acharya, A. Global Governance in a Multiplex World. European University Institute: Robert Schuman Centre for 




«the power and purpose of the US and the West»44, emerging powers tried to coordinate 
themselves and to manifest their dissatisfaction about such a state of affairs in world politics. If, 
as affirmed by the Neo-Realist Kenneth Waltz in his 1979’s Theory of International Politics, «a 
legitimate international order tends toward stability and peace»45, one comprehends why matters 
such as ‘legitimacy’ and perceptions about a ‘legitimate world order’ are at the top of the political 
agenda for rising powers.  
Analysts state for instance that «Western universalism is slowly being replaced by the 
new characteristics of the emerging world order»46, pointing out to the rising of a multipolar 
scenario in international affairs. Indeed, «one of the leading trends in world politics today is the 
growing number of countries with some degree of status dissatisfaction»47, with transitions in 
economic power prompting some States to challenge the status quo48.  But what examples there 
are about insufficient legitimacy and/or lack of representation concerning current institutions of 
global governance?  
 
1.3 CRITICIZED MECHANISMS OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
 
One such criticized mechanism is the UN Security Council [UNSC], perceived as a 
non-legitimate mechanism of global governance due to its oligarchic structure, and generating 
«repeated demands by many countries for a comprehensive and inclusive reform»49 to expand both 
the permanent and non-permanent seats. The Council’s composition, for some, represents «the 
unequal power relations that exist between States»50, with its limited permanent-membership de 
facto restricting the management of world security affairs51 within the hands of a few powers. As 
stated by Finnemore «the United Nations cannot exist without this concession to power 
 
44 Acharya, A. Global Governance in a Multiplex World, p. 10 
45 Waltz, K. N. Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979, p.63 
46 Lagutina, M. L. BRICS in A World of Regions. Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal, 2019. URL: 
<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/23802014.2019.1643781?needAccess=true>, p.1 
47 Mazarr, M J et al. Understanding the Emerging Era of International Competition: Theoretical and Historical 
Perspectives, p.20. URL: <https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2726.html> 
48 Çiftci, O. Neoliberalism on Regional Conflicts. TUIC Academy: 2019. URL: 
<http://www.tuicakademi.org/neoliberalism-on-regional-
conflicts/?fbclid=IwAR32z8TdkqnagpoNWPE1fP_fUluFyfBzc8sL-EqfJcnagro0m4stWASCPME> 
49 «A atual estrutura oligárquica do Conselho de Segurança [...] tem gerado repetidas demandas, por parte dos mais 
diversos países, por uma reforma ampla e inclusiva» (original quotation in portuguese) Sloboda, P.M; Val, E.M. 
Revisitando o Novo Multilateralismo Latino-Americano e seu Impacto na Reforma do Conselho De Segurança Das 
Nações Unidas. Revista Vía Iuris, 2015, Vol. 18, p.187. URL: 
<http://190.242.99.229/index.php/ViaIuris/article/view/587/pdf_40> 
50 Elias, J; Sutch, P. International Relations: The Basics. New York: Routledge, 2007, p.86 
51 Vigevani, T; Cepaluni, G. A Política Externa Brasileira: A Busca pela Autonomia, de Sarney à Lula. São Paulo: 




asymmetries»52 which does not necessarily mean that all States approve the decisions taken by the 
Council’s 5 permanent-members. Without representation for both Africa and Latin America for 
instance, the balance that equates power and legitimacy will remain mismatched53 and the UNSC 
illegitimate in the eyes of many countries. When one looks for instance at the percentage of UNSC 
permanent members in relation to all UN member-States throughout history, it becomes clear that 
the overall representativity of that mechanism has diminished over time (see ATTACHMENTS).  
Regarding the Bretton Woods institutions, «the most institutionalized and rule-
governed component»54 of the post-war period, its branches represented by the IMF and the World 
Bank are frequently criticized as being instruments «used by rich industrialized countries to control 
poorer ones […] shoring up an economic system that benefits the wealthy at the expense of the 
poor»55, a claim that has everything to do with many countries’ grievances towards those 
institutions.  
On the one hand, criticized for representing a financial institution used to persuade 
less-powerful countries into opening their economies through policies of deregulation, 
privatization and accepting external interference in their internal affairs56, for many years the 
IMF «forced States in the developing world to cut welfare spending in favor of debt repayment», 
while arguing that these policies were intended to bring prosperity to developing nations. 
However, IMF specialists reported that the organization had in fact «seriously underestimated the 
perils of financial liberalization, both domestic and external»57 and memories related to IMF 
dependency and debt repayment have instigated anti-IMF sentiments in many countries in the 
global south, with the institution being sometimes even equated to American imperialism. A 
renowned Brazilian economist writes for instance that «the problem of the IMF is not its excessive 
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power, but its deplorable submission to the […] interests of the United States»58, a point of view 
that is representative of the suspicion held towards that institution.  
Additionally,  the amount of voting shares enjoyed by the US and a handful of Western 
allies at the IMF is considered to be one among «numerous examples of U.S. predominance in 
rule-making bodies that have given the United States competitive advantage»59 providing 
Americans with the utmost authority about how the organization operates. In terms of 
Quotas/Voting Shares the US is slightly overrepresented at the IMF in comparison to the country’s 
share of Global GDP by PPP (Purchasing Power Parity), while slightly underrepresented when it 
comes to its share of nominal Global GDP (see ATTACHMENTS). However, together with 
countries of the G7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United 
States), the overall Western dominance at the IMF becomes evident. All other Western countries 
(but the US) are overrepresented in their Quotas/Voting Shares at the IMF in comparison to their 
share (in %) of Global GDP by PPP as well as nominal Global GDP.  
The G7 currently has 41.2% of the Voting Shares at the IMF (before 2010’s Quota 
Reforms this percentage was 43%), while BRICS countries, on the other hand, now hold some 
13.54%; the most significant increase after 2010’s Quota Reforms came from China, whose voting 
power went from 3.8% to 6% after 201060 (see ATTACHMENTS). Non-Western countries such 
as China (in particular) and India are both underrepresented in terms of Quotas/Voting Shares at 
the IMF in comparison to their actual share of Global GDP by PPP (see again ATTACHMENTS) 
and nominal Global GDP. This comparison regarding shares and quotas at the IMF between the 
Western and non-Western countries is important because differently from the UN General 
Assembly for instance, where decisions follow the ‘one-country one-vote’ principle, «the IMF 
follows a corporative decision-making model»61, therefore the US, in particular, and the G7, more 
generally, hold a managerial advantage at the institution.  
In view of the afore-mentioned, during early 2000s, as many States lifted themselves 
from debt (as Brazil and Russia) and economic instability, the world that surrounded the IMF 
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changed, which was characterized by «a shift in global economic, and therefore political, 
power»62, setting the stage for emerging economies to voice their dissatisfaction with the current 
state of affairs. Some, by its turn, associate this shift in global [economic] power to the rise of the 
so-called revisionist States which aspire (among other things) to «increase their relative power, 
status, and voice in the system»63, an interpretation frequently associated to the BRICS countries 
since its’s formation in 2009.  
Thus, as many countries emerged economically during the last decades, they also 
contested the Western (an ultimately American) hegemony prevalent within the system since the 
1990s. Moreover, the United States has, since early 2000s, ignored numerous international 
agreements, regimes and political commitments that affected in any way its capacity for unilateral 
action64. Nevertheless, as Neorealists put it «the American aspiration to freeze historical 
development by working to keep the world unipolar is doomed […] the very effort to maintain a 
hegemonic position is the surest way to undermine it. The effort to maintain dominance stimulates 
some countries to work to overcome it»65, which can be seen through the efforts of emerging 
countries to reach political concertation.  
Overall, as reminded by Barnett and Duvall, «institutions established at one point in 
time [such as the UNSC, the World Bank and the IMF] can have ongoing and unintended effects 
[such as lack of legitimacy and resistance to change] at a later point. Long-standing institutions 
represent frozen configurations of privilege [as in the cases of veto power enjoyed by the 5 
permanent-members of the Security Council or the Western dominance in global financial 
institutions]»66 limiting the choices of other States within the system. Structural power, as those 
embedded within the Security Council and within Bretton Woods institutions, shapes actors' self-
understandings67, whereas privileged members of the international community believe they are the 
only ones entitled with dealing with matters of ‘global’ significance.  
 
62 Wolf, M. Today and Tomorrow: To meet future challenges, the IMF must have strong backing from its members, 
p.5. URL: <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2019/06/pdf/the-future-of-the-imf-wolf.pdf> 
63 Mazarr, M. J et al. Understanding the Emerging Era of International Competition: Theoretical and Historical 
Perspectives, p.16. URL: <https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2726.html> 
64 Fiori, J.L. Formação, Expansão e Limites do Poder Global. Rio de Janeiro: 2004, p.42. URL: 
<https://pt.scribd.com/document/155130423/09-FIORI-Jose-L-Formacao-Expansao-e-Limites-do-Poder-Global-
pdf> 
65 Waltz, K. Structural Realism after the Cold War. International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), pp. 5–41, 
p.37 






This thought, however, is not shared by States that feel dissatisfied about the overall 
state of affairs and their lack of representation and voice in decision-making processes inside the 
system. Whereas structural power generally «envisions hierarchical and binary relations of 
domination that work to the advantage of those structurally empowered»68, States located at the 
outer rings of ‘power’ feel justifiably underrepresented and alienated within institutions whose 
resistance to change leads ultimately to a ‘crisis of legitimacy’.  
  
Naturally, «when governments are unhappy with the status quo, they will enact new 
policies in an attempt to improve their condition»69, an observation that accurately represents the 
actions undertaken by Brazil, China, India and Russia when establishing the group BRIC(S) after 
the 2008’s Financial Crisis. What might as well explain the formation of the BRICS’s arrangement 
is each member’s individual grievances towards, at one point or another, the American and/or 
Western hegemonism in world affairs. The BRICS association, therefore, works as a strengthened 
political platform for the 5 States that compose it, in order to stand in better conditions to defend 
their common interests.   
Brazil and Russia, the two countries most closely scrutinized in this thesis, had their 
own political grievances and uncomfortable situations associated with the West and/or with the 
Western-dominated institutions of global governance. Brazil, on the one hand, during the 1980s 
and 1990s, was in notable indebtedness to the IMF, which jeopardized the country’s national 
autonomy and deepened its dependency on international creditors, bringing about reflections about 
the acute dichotomy between North and South, developed and developing countries.  
Russia, by its turn, while a non-participant in the institutions tailored by the West 
during the Cold War, became fully integrated in those same institutions from the 1990s onwards 
after the fall of the Soviet Union. However, for Russia a constant sense of estrangement stemming 
from decades of opposition between East and West is yet not completely overthrown, due to 
decisions taken by both the United States and Europe, in a Post-Cold War context, without taking 
into consideration Moscow’s national interests, especially during the 1990s and early 2000s.  
That being said, both Brazil and Russia would voice their dissatisfaction about the 
perceived inadequacies of the current state of world affairs through BRICS, a group whose views 
and positions on the main institutions of global governance is the theme of our next Chapter.  
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BRICS APPROACH TO THE REFORM OF THE CURRENT 
SYSTEM OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
 
2.1 BRICS IN TODAY’S WORLD 
 
An example of emerging economies’ coordination with an aim to improve their 
position within the international system is represented by the BRICS group (established in 2009 
after the Financial Crisis), composed by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. The original 
acronym BRIC stemmed from a paper by the economist Jim O'Neill (of Goldman Sachs) in 2001, 
advising investors to pay more close attention to those emerging economies in terms of future and 
reliable investments. By that time, during the first decade of the 2000s, all BRIC countries were 
growing at a fast pace; as an example, from 2000 to 2007, BRIC States exceeded 5% GDP growth 
in average, with China, by its turn, reaching almost 15%70 GDP growth in average during the 
period.  
With the inclusion of South Africa in 2011 BRICS attested the tendency in world 
politics «toward convergence and interaction of States located thousands of kilometers away from 
each other»71 with the group containing members from 4 out of the 7 world continents: Asia 
(China, India and Russia), Europe (Russia), South America (Brazil) and Africa (South Africa). 
BRICS «common aversion to the dominant power of the G7, [and] particularly the United States»72 
motivated the group to look for ways to shift the current system of global governance, away from 
a Western-centric model to a more inclusive arrangement73, where emerging countries can play a 
greater role in decision-making.  
BRICS, on the one hand, defines itself as «an important force for incremental change 
and reform of current institutions towards more representative and equitable governance»74, 
representing as of today 41,5 % of the world’s population vis-à-vis G7’s 9, 98%75. In regard to 
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BRICS classification, some posit that the group falls into the category of reformist States, defined 
by their dissatisfaction «with the West’s geopolitical and geoeconomical dominance in the 
world»76, while attempting to complement existing structures of global governance77. Indeed, as 
stated by a Brazil-based specialist on BRICS «none of the group's proposals question the basic 
rules and norms that underpin today's global order, and the legitimacy of key institutions, such as 
the UN Security Council, is not questioned»78, thus prompting an understanding of BRICS not as 
a force of disruption, but of reasonable and necessary reform of the current state of affairs in the 
international system.  
BRICS major objectives, according to another point of view, concern «the promotion 
of a shift from the paradigm of a Western-dominated system of global governance to a more 
inclusive [one]» 79, where emerging countries, as represented by Brazil, China, Russia and India, 
can play important roles in global decision-making. Western media, on the other hand, accuses 
BRICS of being «an unwelcome challenge to the established world order as defined by the US-
dominated UN Security Council, the IMF and the World Bank»80, an understanding that goes in 
line with the interpretation of BRICS as a potential threatening force to the preeminent position of 
the West in the international arena81. Be it as it may, so far BRICS, in the words of Russian 
professor Maria Lagutina, contends against «the hegemonic nature of the current world order and 
the unfair structure of the world economic architecture»82, as demonstrated by the group’s 
positions in all its Summits and Declarations.  
For Russia in particular, BRICS’s inception was based on the ideas of the renowned 
diplomat Yevgeniy Primakov (Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1996 to 1998 and Prime-
Minister between 1998 and 1999), whose doctrine postulated that Russia’s national interests on 
the international arena should be achieved not only with the West’s help, but by establishing 
partnerships with Asian (and non-Western) emerging powers such as China and India83. Primakov 
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made it clear «that the American-led unilateralism in international politics is unacceptable to 
Russia»84, and thus Moscow explored the formation of an Eastern bloc, facilitating the opposition 
to the Western (and ultimately American) hegemony in world affairs85. For Russia, moreover, 
BRICS reflects a trend «towards the formation of a polycentric system (see point 3.1, Chapter 3) 
of international relations»86, setting the group as a platform for cooperation between States 
dissatisfied with their position and voice in global decision-making.  
In short, BRICS is important for Russia because it facilitates the achievement of the 
following objectives (among others): 
• facilitate reform in international monetary and financial system; 
• enhance Russia’s foreign policy multivector character; 
• develop privileged bilateral relations with BRICS partners87; 
 
For Brazil, on the other hand, prior to the group’s creation, former Brazilian Foreign 
Minister Celso Amorim88 affirmed, still in 2008, that Brazil, Russia, India and China were trying 
to consolidate a political bloc to help balance and democratize international order at the beginning 
of the 21st century. Prior to BRICS, Brazil also explored the formation of political associations 
such as IBSA (group composed by Brazil, India and South Africa, 3 of the 5 BRICS members) to 
strengthen South-South cooperation and the country`s international advocacy `multilateralism` 
and plurality in world affairs (see point 3.1, Chapter 3). Since 2009, therefore, BRICS became yet 
another important political platform for Brazil, enabling the country, alongside other Regional and 
Great Powers, to voice their common dissatisfaction with the current IR structure.  
In short, BRICS is also important for Brazil because it facilitates the achievement of 
the following objectives (among others): 
• facilitate reform in international monetary and financial institutions; 
• enhance the country`s advocacy of multilateralism and plurality in world affairs; 
• to counterpoise Western hegemonism, through concertation with emerging States 
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2.2 BRICS APPROACH TO MULTIPOLARITY AND 
MULTILATERALISM IN WORLD AFFAIRS 
 
BRICS strength resides in the fact that the group (albeit composed by heterogeneous 
countries) pursues the common goal of resisting a Unipolar system dominated by the US, while 
seeking the consolidation of a more democratic multipolar world89. That desire for democratization 
in world politics was therefore translated into an advocacy for multilateralism and multipolarity in 
international relations by the BRICS group since its first Summit in 2009.  
In its first Declaration, BRICS stated their support «for a more democratic and just 
multi-polar world order based on […] collective decision-making of all States»90, demonstrating 
the group’s consensus on the necessity for multiple centers of power within the system, and for the 
inclusion of a wider arrange of players in global decision-making processes. In 2011 Sanya’s 
Declaration, BRICS emphasized that the world was «undergoing far-reaching, complex and 
profound changes, marked by the strengthening of multipolarity [representing a process in 
motion]»91, a perception reiterated in 2016’s Goa’s Declaration.  Two years later, in 2018’s 
Johannesburg’s Declaration, the group stated that the UN Charter was the ‘fundamental 
cornerstone’ fostering cooperation and stability in a multipolar order92, apparently suggesting that 
multipolarity was indeed a reality in world politics.  
In BRICS understanding, ‘Unipolarity’, or the outstanding power and privileges 
enjoyed by the United States in the system after the end of the Cold War, is viewed negatively. As 
Neorealists put it «international politics abhors unbalanced power. Faced with unbalanced power, 
some States try to increase their own strength or they ally with others to bring the international 
distribution of power into balance»93, an observation that goes in line with BRICS attitude when 
it comes to setting political coordination between Regional Powers such as Brazil, India and South 
Africa and Great Powers such as Russia and China in order to oppose ‘Unipolarity’ in world 
affairs.  
Apart from ‘multipolarity’ itself, BRICS also emphasizes the importance of 
‘multilateralism’ and ‘multilateral institutions’ in providing political/diplomatic solutions for acute 
problems of international life. In BRICS case, a strong emphasis has always been placed on 
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«multilateral diplomacy with the United Nations playing the central role in dealing with global 
challenges and threats»94, thus reaffirming the group’s commitment to the UN System. The 
declaration of 2010 in Brasilia kept the same tone, without substantial changes in the discourse. In 
Sanya’s Declaration of 2011, BRICS asserted the group’s role in «enhancing multilateralism and 
promoting greater democracy in international relations»95, pointing to the group’s active 
contribution towards multilateralism in international affairs, and not its support on a rhetorical 
level.  
During the Fourth BRICS Summit’s Delhi Declaration, BRICS stated their readiness 
to work with all countries on the basis of «international law and multilateral decision making»96, 
defending the strengthening of «multilateral approaches on issues pertaining to global peace and 
security»97 within the frameworks of the UN and its Security Council. In Delhi’s Declaration, for 
instance, the world ‘multilateral’ appeared 9 times in the final document, in comparison to 5 times 
in the previous summit.  One year later, the novelty of eThekwini’s Declaration was BRICS 
reiteration of UN’ role «as the foremost multilateral forum […] [and] the center of global 
governance and multilateralism»98, while at the same time emphasizing their commitment to work 
within the UN System in order to «strengthen multilateral approaches in international relations 
based on the rule of law»99, demonstrating the growing importance of the concept of 
‘multilateralism’ for the group. In eThekwini’s Declaration the world ‘multilateral’ appeared 11 
times in the final document, in comparison to 9 times in the previous summit. 
During the 6th BRICS Summit’s in Fortaleza (Brazil), BRICS pointed to the wide 
international recognition of the group’s commitment to international law and multilateralism, 
while providing a great contribution to global peace and economic stability100. In Fortaleza’s 
Declaration, by its turn, the world ‘multilateral’ appeared 16 times in the final document, in 
comparison to 11 times in the previous summit. From 2015 to 2017, BRICS declarations would 
not bring, however, significant additions to the overall discourse on multilateralism of previous 
reunions. 
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In 2018, by its turn, the 10th BRICS Summit Johannesburg’s Declaration was the first 
one to bring a section named ‘Strengthening Multilateralism, Reforming Global Governance and 
Addressing Common Challenges’ where the group expressed their commitment once more to the 
«strengthening of multilateral institutions of global governance»101, with the world ‘multilateral’ 
appearing some 19 times throughout the final document, the biggest number so far in comparison 
to all previous summits. The very last BRICS summit, which happened in Brasilia in 2019, would 
bring in its final declaration a whole new section named ‘Strengthening and reforming the 
multilateral system’, where the group declared their intention to help «overcome the significant 
challenges currently facing multilateralism»102, in an implicit allusion to the growing trend of 
economic protectionism and unilateral decisions being taken by established powers, especially the 
US, that in recent times had undermined international stability.  
 
2.3 BRICS VIEW ON THE REFORM OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL 
 
As mentioned in the first Chapter, of the most criticized mechanisms of global 
governance in recent years has been the United Nations Security Council and the UN System in 
general. BRIC’s 2009 first Declaration affirmed «the need for a comprehensive reform of the UN 
with a view to making it more efficient»103 with the first mention about a possible reform that 
would also include the UN’s Security Council coming only in 2011 Sanya’s Declaration in China. 
Subsequently, further BRICS declarations had both Russia and China formally recognizing the 
‘importance attached’ to Brazil and India in international affairs, while supporting their aspiration 
«to play a greater role in the UN»104, but without specifying whether Moscow and/or Beijing 
acquiesced to their bid for permanent membership at the UNSC (more on this on Chapter 3).  
In the 6th BRICS Summit: Fortaleza Declaration in 2014, however, the group recalled 
for the first time the 2005’s World Summit Outcome Document, in which all UN members 
manifested their support for an «early reform of the Security Council in order to make it more 
broadly representative, efficient and transparent and thus to further enhance its effectiveness and 
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the legitimacy and implementation of its decisions»105, a demonstrative (albeit indirect) sign of 
BRICS acquiescence about the necessity to implement a reform at the UNSC in some capacity.  
By 2016, on the other hand, BRICS openly recognized that the prevailing architecture 
of global governance was in fact «regulated by institutions which were conceived in 
circumstances when the international landscape in all its aspects was characterized by very 
different challenges and opportunities»106, thus pointing to an overall perception of obsolescence 
regarding current mechanisms of global governance. In the last BRICS Summit held in Brazil in 
2019, the group limited itself to repeat the same lines of previous documents, reaffirming «the 
need for a comprehensive reform of the UN, including its Security Council, with a view to making 
it more representative, effective, and efficient, and to increase the representation of the developing 
countries so that it can adequately respond to global challenges»107, without, once again, specifying 
what countries could fit the role of candidates for permanent-membership.  
On this note, some commentators contend that «the small nucleus of the Great Powers 
[contained within the Security Council as an example] maintains its centrality within the world 
political system, and it is still their decisions and conflicts that determine its dynamics, including 
the “windows of opportunity” open to [other] States»108 not endowed with Great-Power attributes. 
Overall, BRICS declarations on UNSC reform are rather vague, devoid of a clear consent by 
Russia and China about Brazil’s and India’s109 bid for permanent membership at the Council. That 
being said, without a consensus to be found in BRICS’s declarations regarding the Security 
Council reform, a structure that currently lacks legitimacy in the eyes of many countries, the 
advocacy for plurality on the world stage is slightly compromised, once the group loses an 
important opportunity for openly supporting the candidacy for permanent membership for 
countries such as Brazil and South Africa, which are strong representatives of their respective 
continents, South America and Africa.  
In that regard, the acute differences in structural power at the UNSC enjoyed by both 
Russia and China might be the most influential factor behind BRICS vagueness about the issue.   
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2.4 BRICS VIEW ON THE BRETOON WOODS INSTITUTIONS 
 
BRICS intend to «reform the obsolete international financial and economic 
architecture which does not take into account the increased economic power of emerging market 
economies and developing countries»110, a critique constantly leveled against organizations such 
as the World Bank and the IMF. In effect, BRICS` desire «to change the financial architecture […] 
in favor of developing countries»111 was a side-effect of the 2008’s Financial Crisis, which 
provoked considerable distrust about the norms and rules of the financial system ruled by the West, 
creating an opportunity for emerging countries to claim a bigger participation in the world's 
economic governance112.  
In its very first Joint Statement BRICS declared its commitment «to advance the 
reform of international financial institutions, so as to reflect changes in the global economy»113, 
changes represented by a shift in wealth and economic power to more States around the world. In 
addition, the 2009 declaration suggested that «the emerging and developing economies must have 
greater voice and representation in international financial institutions, whose heads and executives 
should be appointed through an open, transparent, and merit-based selection process»114, an 
implicit criticism about how the Heads of both the World Bank and the IMF were selected.  
For BRICS a ‘merit-based selection process’ should not consider a specific nationality 
(or nationalities) to occupy the top positions in institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. 
Indeed, according to critics, for an institution «to be credibly global, its top job cannot be 
permanently left in the hands of a European, however admirable some of those Europeans have 
been»115, which is exactly the case when it comes to the Heads of the IMF for instance. Due to this 
perception by BRICS countries about American and/or European occupation of high posts in 
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global financial institutions, the legitimacy of the Post-War economic order faces increasing 
criticisms116.  
BRICS, moreover, openly declares that the IMF and the World Bank suffer from 
‘legitimacy deficits’ and that «reforming these institutions' governance structures requires first and 
foremost a substantial shift in voting power in favor of emerging market economies and developing 
countries to bring their participation in decision making in line with their relative weight in the 
world economy»117, something to be achieved via proposals related to IMF’ Quota Reforms. With 
the group in favor of a «comprehensive review of the quota formula to better reflect economic 
weights»118, BRICS stands against the G7’s overrepresentation in terms of Quotas/Voting Shares 
at the IMF in comparison to their actual contribution to global economy (see point 1.2, Chapter 1).  
BRICS also advices the leadership at the World Bank, part of the ‘Post-World War 
international economic order’ created by the developed countries of the North119, to make the 
institution respond to «the vision of all its members […] [reflecting the] current economic and 
political reality»120 of today`s world and not only reflect the point of view of its most powerful 
stakeholders. The World Bank, according to BRICS, should also shift its focus from North-South 
cooperation to equal partnership among its members, thus overcoming «an outdated donor-
recipient dichotomy»121 and changing a historical top-down (rich State-poor State) dynamic that 
characterized projects of development undertaken by the bank. On this note, BRICS alluded to the 
asymmetric and unequal character present within the relationship between donor and recipient 
countries, pertaining to a North-South dynamic122. 
Due to the afore-mentioned, after BRIC’s first formal summit in Yekaterinburg 
(Russia), the group readily laid out a plan for the creation of an investment bank to complement 
institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF123. For that purpose, BRICS established in 2015 
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the New Development Bank (or NDB), whose goal is to finance sustainable development projects 
not only in member countries, but also in other emerging States of the system124. Since its 
inception, the NDB has approved 23 loans totalizing some US$ 5.7 billion to finance projects 
associated with renewable energy, transportation, infrastructure, sanitation etc125. Brazil alone has 
been granted US$ 1.41 billion for projects linked with renewable energy, environmental protection 
and sustainable urban infrastructure and transportation, while Russia was granted US$ 1.668 
billion for analogous projects and a US$ 100 million loan for developing clean energy126.  
For some analysts, NDB’s creation can be explained by BRICS’ «dissatisfaction with 
the slow pace of reform of existing institutions»127, the main example of which represented by the 
lack of reform in favor of emerging countries at the IMF. According, for instance, to NDB’s 
General Strategy document «the creation of the Bank is an expression of the growing role of 
BRICS and other emerging market and developing countries (EMDCs) in the world economy, and 
their greater willingness to act independently in matters of international economic governance and 
development»128, which translates to a general perception of the difficulty of established 
institutions to better adequate/accommodate the interests of rising powers within the system. In 
BRICS view, the NDB will then «supplement the existing efforts of multilateral and regional 
financial institutions for global growth and development»129, playing a complementary role to that 
of the Bretton Woods organizations created in 1944.130 
However, although not directly in defiance of the financial order established since the 
aftermath of World War II, the NDB is demonstrative of BRICS dissatisfaction about global 
economic decision-making residing within the hands of a handful of Western powers131. Moreover, 
differently from the practices of the IMF, the BRICS bank operates with no conditionality – be it 
political, social or otherwise - tied to its loans132, thus upholding the principle of ‘non-interference’ 
in the internal affairs of recipient countries.  
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Instead of a simplified «one size fits all» formula for achieving economic 
development, as advocated by the IMF, NDB’s projects are declared to be «tailored to individual 
country needs»133, based on a «democratic decision-making and inclusivity of all stakeholders»134, 
placing potential borrowers and the NDB at the same level of participation in common projects, 
promoting a dialogue of equals. NDB states for instance that «projects will be most successful 
when borrowing countries are in charge of their own development path»135, without any pre-
determined prescribing policy concerning regulatory and/or institutional reforms to be undertaken 
by borrowing countries. 
Another interesting point surrounding the institution regards its shareholding and 
voting rights distribution. In NDB, all BRICS countries hold 20% of the Voting Shares each (see 
ATTACHMENTS), thus avoiding a situation where any one power could control the bank’s 
operations and decision-making due to financial preponderance136, a situation often quoted to be 
the case when it comes to the IMF and the World Bank for instance (see point 1.2, Chapter 1). If, 
on the other hand, the Voting Rights at the NDB were to follow the relative economic size of each 
BRICS’ member in terms of GDP, China would then become the uncontested hegemon of the 
institution, holding 67% of all Voting Rights (see simulation in ATTACHMENTS). In short, 
NDB’s declarations so far demonstrate that the institution wants to provide an alternative for the 
current architecture of world financial governance, while aimed not to replace the existing Bretton 
Woods organizations, but to complement it.  
BRICS, in this way, demonstrates that the group is showing a non-hegemonic approach 
in terms of its own institutionalization, whereas keeping its original discourse and demonstration 
of dissatisfaction towards the Western dominance in Bretton Woods institutions, and towards the 
ways in which both the IMF and the World Bank operates. Finally, while, in Chapter 2, we have 
examined BRICS positions about the principal mechanisms of global governance established after 
the end of World War II, the third Chapter of our thesis will present Brazil`s and Russia`s 
individual stances on the current state of affairs in world politics.  
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ANALYSIS OF BRAZIL’S AND RUSSIA’S POSITIONS ON 
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
 
For the most part, the current Chapter will rely methodologically on a content analysis 
of texts reproduced during speeches and discourses by political leaders, State officials and 
Ministers. We assume that most politicians indeed «possess unique worldviews and, therefore, 
[…] subjectivity affects decision-maker perceptions»137 about a given country’s national interests 
and position in the international system. We also agree as well that personal predispositions of any 
leader can be transformed into general guidelines for foreign affairs «because beliefs and motives 
[do] suggest ways of interpreting the environment»138, therefore Heads of State «are likely to urge 
their governments to act in ways consistent with such images»139, being hard to dissociate 
ideological upbringing with political action and conduct.  
The discourses and countries’ positioning concerning the topics scrutinized in this 
Chapter encompass the period between early 2000s up until 2018, thus excluding the most recent 
Brazilian government of Jair Bolsonaro. During that period, in Russia we had the presidencies of 
Vladimir Putin [2000-2008, 2012-2018] and Dmitry Medvedev [2008-2012], while in Brazil the 
country was governed by the Labors’ Party headed by Luiz Inacio (Lula) da Silva [2003-2010] 
and Dilma Rousseff [2011-2016], followed, after Dilma’s impeachment process in 2016, by a two-
year presidential term by Michel Temer [2016-2018].   
 
3.1 BRAZIL`S AND RUSSIA’S POSITIONS ON MULTIPOLARITY AND 
MULTILATERALISM 
  
According to analysts, both Brazil and Russia resent the existing US-dominated and 
inequitable world order140, while postulating the importance of multilateralism in international 
affairs to mitigate the effects of American unilateral acts in foreign policy. On the Brazilian side, 
the importance of multilateralism is a common theme often found within the country’s political 
discourse. Former president Dilma Rousseff, for instance, once stated that Brazil is «a country that 
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believes in multilateralism as the most efficient way to produce stable international consensus»141, 
the logic being that, if operating within a strong multilateral system, Brazilian foreign policy can 
mitigate the impact of [Great] power politics142.  
Brazil also manifested its support for multilateralism in world affairs within the 
frameworks of different political associations such as the IBSA forum (composed by Brazil, India 
and South Africa in 2003143), whose declarations affirm the country’s commitment to 
multilateralism and to a multilateral system of international politics. Without a strong 
military/nuclear back-up Brazil focused on ‘multilateral solutions’ for international problems, 
supporting the strengthening of rules and institutions of Global Governance144 to achieve its 
national interests. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs (between 2013-2014) Luiz Alberto 
Figueiredo stated once that by principle and for achieving Brazil’s national interests, the country 
favors the ‘deconcentration of power’ in IR, a process that requires the strengthening of 
multilateralism in world affairs145.  
Likewise, Russia also seeks «the strengthening of principles of multilateralism in 
international affairs»146, with the term ‘multilateralism’ often found in a number of governmental 
documents, such as the Foreign Policy Concept for instance. The rhetoric importance given by 
both States to ‘multilateralism’ in world affairs, be it in political discourse or in official documents, 
is thus reinforced by statements done by BRICS, where the group jointly affirms their commitment 
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to multilateral diplomacy, with the United Nations playing a central role in dealing with global 
challenges and threats147. 
Beyond multilateralism, on the other hand, the concept of ‘multipolarity’ in 
international politics is one also often present in Brazil’s and Russia’s political discourse and 
documents. When visiting Russia in 2002, for instance, former Brazilian president Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso stated that both countries defended a multipolar [world] order, based on equality 
between States and the value of the United Nations148, a statement that resonated well with 
authorities in Moscow. More recently, Brazil and Russia also promised to promote a more 
democratic and just ‘multipolar international order’, based on the primacy of multilateralism149 
aforementioned in previous paragraphs. 
However, is Brazil’s and Russia’s interpretation of ‘multipolarity’ one and the same? 
For Russia, since early 2000s the country’s foreign policy strategy consists in avoiding 
the consolidation of a unipolar world under US domination, based on the redistribution of world 
power by new emerging poles150. [Vladimir] Putin’s foreign policy became oriented to oppose the 
concept – as well as the realization - of a unipolar order based on American hegemony151, while 
building up the conditions for the establishment of a multipolar world152 reflecting its civilizational 
diversity153. In effect, perhaps one of the most emblematic [and more evident] criticisms towards 
unipolarity in Russian political discourse came in 2007, during Putin’s speech at the Munich 
Conference on Security Policy in Germany, when the Russian president delivered the following 
speech: «the history of mankind surely knows periods of unipolar dominance and the desire for 
world domination. […] However, what is a unipolar world? No matter how this term is decorated, 
it ultimately means, in practice, only one thing: it represents one center of authority, one center of 
power, one center of decision-making. This is the world of one master, one sovereign. And this is 
ultimately fatal not only for everyone who is within this framework, but also for the sovereign 
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itself, because it destroys him from the inside»154, a declaration that had much to do with Russia’s 
resentment about its weakened position during the 1990s, when the world was experienced an 
Unipolar momentum under the auspices of the US.  
Russia has in fact several grievances towards the US other than the current sanctions 
imposed by the West in connection with the outcomes of the Ukrainian crisis, sufficing to mention 
for instance the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]’s expansion during late 1990s and 
early 2000s bringing Western military infrastructure closer to the Russian borders155. During the 
1990s, with the dissolution of the USSR, Russia left its position as a world power, experiencing a 
dramatic reduction in its international prestige, a shock for a country that for centuries had been 
accustomed to playing a major role in world politics156. In Putin’s era, however, Russia tried to 
regain its historic role as a global player, that is, a country with global interests and capacity to 
influence world politics157. Moreover, Russia has repeatedly acknowledged itself as a Great 
Power, one deserving of recognition in the international arena.  
In fact, Moscow’s interests at the international level, according to its National Security 
Concept, consist in securing the country’s position as a Great Power and one of the most influential 
centers of a multipolar world158. When it comes to academic assessments, authors such as Buzan 
and Wæver also classify Russia as a Great Power, alongside the European Union (EU), China and 
Japan, while still considering the US as a Superpower. Their classification of Great Power is 
relative to States «responded to by others on the basis of system level calculations about the present 
and near-future distribution of power […] They [the Great Powers] will generally think of 
themselves as more than Regional Powers […] and they will usually be capable of operating in 
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more than one region»159, which can be demonstrated by Russia’s involvement in Ukraine in 2014 
(within the Post-Soviet space) and Syria (in the Middle-East) from 2015 onwards.  
In effect, Putin's foreign policy became more assertive thanks to Russia's growing 
economic might in the first decade of the 2000s, at a time of significant increase in the prices of 
oil and gas prices in international markets160. Concomitantly, Russia’s traditionally strong defense 
industry became once again, as during the Soviet era, «one of the most important components of 
[Russia’s] position as a power of global significance»161 underpinning the country`s ‘independent 
role in international politics’. Being one of the system`s Great Powers, frequently on Foreign 
Policy Documents, Russia mentions its support for ‘multipolarity’ in regard to Moscow`s desired 
world order, constantly pointing out to the ‘emergence of a multipolar international system’162. 
However, since 2008’s Foreign Policy Concept, alongside the term ‘Multipolarity’, 
Russia also used, in official documents, the concept of ‘Polycentricity’, mentioning a trend towards 
a ‘polycentric world order’ based on the economic growth of a number of countries and regions 
that increased their political influence in the system163. In 2013, Moscow acknowledged that IR 
was in a «process of transition, the essence of which is the creation of a polycentric system»164 
characterized by a «decentralization of the global system of governance»165, with ‘regional 
governance’ emerging as its basis, due to new centers of ‘economic growth’ and political power. 
Those new centers, according to Moscow, were assuming increased responsibility for their 
respective regions, culminating in processes of regional integration in different parts of the 
world166. This polycentric Russian view of IR, in theory, could place Brazil as one such center of 
‘economic power’ responsible for integrational processes in South America.  
Having briefly discussed Russia`s position concerning multipolarity (as well as the 
concept of polycentricity), we shall then scrutinize Brazil’s own understanding of ‘Multipolarity’ 
and the associations made by politicians and government officials regarding the term. First of all, 
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when it comes to academic assessments, Brazil is identified for instance as a Regional Power, 
according to Buzan and Wæver`s classification, meaning States whose capabilities «loom large in 
their regions, but do not register much in a broad-spectrum way at the global level […] They are 
thus excluded from the higher-level calculations of system polarity whether or not they think of 
themselves as deserving a higher ranking»167, a trait somewhat representative of Brazil’s historical 
quest for recognition vis-à-vis the international community (see point 3.2, CHAPTER 3).  
On the other hand, according to analysts, the ‘hegemonic stabilizing role’ of Brazil in 
South America helps to explain that continent's most stable character in comparison to other 
regions of the world168, with the country representing a de facto ‘regional unipole’. On this note, 
«among the permanent objectives of Brazilian foreign policy is the strengthening of relations with 
the countries of Latin America, with which the country intends to forge economic, political, social 
and cultural integration»169 as stated in Brazil’s Constitution. Brazil, therefore, exercises its 
regional hegemony through processes of institutionalization and efforts aimed towards regional 
integration170, such as the Mercosur and Unasur. The former represents the Southern Common 
Market, an integration project founded by Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay in 1991, 
originally intended to provide: 1) the free movement of goods and services through the elimination 
of customs duties and non-tariff restrictions; 2) the establishment of a common external tariff and 
commercial policy in relation to other States, while coordinating positions in regional and 
international economic-commercial forums. In 2014 for instance, the Mercosur Heads of State 
reaffirmed the bloc’s role as a political, economic, social and cultural space, promoting 
multipolarity and a more just and solidary world171. 
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Unasur (or South American Community of Nations), on the other hand, was created in 
2008 with 12 signatory States172 with a view to unify all the South American economies and to 
promote the cultural, economic, social and environmental development of the continent. That 
being said, a Brazilian understanding of multipolarity (as expressed by former president Dilma 
Rousseff) slightly differs from the Russian one, taking into account the South American continent 
as a whole, and as a ‘sovereign and prosperous region’ capable of playing a relevant and active 
role in a multipolar world173, overcoming its historical stigma of being passive object of 
international relations. In that way, once a non-participant of the Great Power club, Brazil 
associates its political weight with the whole of South America, thus entertaining the thought of 
having the continent itself as a pole of a multipolar world order, something to be achieved through 
the consolidation of processes of integration within the region.  
 
3.2 BRAZIL AND RUSSIA’S POSITIONS ON THE REFORM OF THE 
UNSC 
 
According to a Brazilian diplomat, rotative members of the UNSC are at most in the 
background of deliberative decisions of the organ, a stigma shared by entire continents such as 
South America (home to 430 million people) and Africa (home to 1.24 billion people, or 17% of 
the world’s population)174. On this note, the most recent Joint Communiqué by IBSA in 2018 
stated that «no reform of the United Nations will be complete without the reform of the Security 
Council»175 by expanding its permanent and non-permanent members, providing an adequate 
representation for developing countries. Additionally, within the frameworks of IBSA, India, 
South Africa and Brazil manifested their support for each other’s candidacies for permanent 
membership in a reformed and enlarged UNSC176.  
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In fact, according to a former Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs «it is a feature of 
Brazilian foreign policy to defend […] the greater participation of a larger number of actors in 
Global Governance»177, which includes naturally the UNSC itself. At least since the Labor Party 
came to power and following a consistent economic growth witnessed between 2003 and 2008, 
even prompting the periodic The Economist to conclude that the country was finally taking off, 
Brazil’s main goal in foreign policy became the obtainment of a permanent seat at the UNSC178.  
This quest for recognition at the world stage «has long been an integral part of Brazil’s 
global strategy»179 with the country’s international standing greatly depending on how it is 
perceived by other States in the system. This quest, however, is not entirely new in Brazilian 
history. As an example, during Artur Bernardes’ Government (1922-1926) in early 20th century, 
Brazil placed its bid for permanent membership at the League of Nations Council, in order to 
elevate the country’s international status to one equivalent of the European Great Powers180. The 
League’s Council was by that time composed by four permanent members: France, Italy, Japan, 
and the United Kingdom, whose task also included the settlement of international disputes181, 
much alike today’s UNSC. Brazil, in particular, was originally among its first 4 non-permanent 
members, alongside Belgium, Greece and Spain182, a position nevertheless considered to be 
‘secondary’ for the country.    
Back to the present day, in order to press for reform at the UNSC, Brazil, Japan, 
Germany and India established in 2011 a political association known as the G4. During that time, 
the search for a higher status in international affairs was «one of the most visible features of 
Brazilian foreign policy, manifested in ambitious diplomatic initiatives»183 and political 
concertation between the country and different Regional Powers. In their first official Ministerial 
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Meeting at the sidelines of 2011’s UN General Assembly, the G4 States affirmed their willingness 
to take on major responsibilities in world affairs, postulating their inclusion as permanent members 
of an expanded UNSC, in order to make it «truly reflective of current geopolitical realities»184, 
therefore enhancing its representativeness and legitimacy185. Since its inception, G4 
representatives have met regularly on the sidelines of UN assemblies, not only on the level of 
Ministries, but also on the level of Heads of State, as happened in 2015 for example. In that 
opportunity, the group declared that more States «have the capacity and willingness to take on 
major responsibilities with regard to maintenance of international peace and security»186, a task 
that should not be restricted within the hands of the 5 permanent-members of the UNSC alone.  
Previous Brazilian Ministers of Foreign Affairs such as Jose Serra, who served from 
2016 to 2017, and Aloysio Nunes, who occupied the post between 2017 and 2019, also pointed 
out to the changes occurred in the international system since the end of the World War II, while 
the UNSC kept its composition intact. Serra, for instance, comments that «the UN Security Council 
still has a core membership that reflects the world of 1945 […] the incorporation of new permanent 
members, could be beneficial to all. It could break the current stalemate that prevents us to solve 
many of the problems and crises that continue to threaten international peace»187, with countries 
such as Brazil, India, Japan and Germany bringing new approaches and views to an institution 
whose composition remains frozen for more than 7 decades.  
Russia, on the other hand, as a permanent member of the UNSC, does not necessarily 
share the same haste towards its reform. On a rhetorical level, Russia indeed recognizes the 
importance of making the Security Council «more representative as part of a reasonable UN 
reform»188 even suggesting the inclusion of new permanent members, «first of all, authoritative 
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developing countries»189, as stated in its Foreign Policy Concept. On the one hand, Russia 
underlined in 2017 its support for Brazil «as a strong and deserving candidate for a permanent 
membership of a reformed UN Security Council»190, a declaration that hasn’t found its way into 
BRICS documents yet191. 
Russia, by its turn, requires that «any decisions to expand membership in the UN 
Security Council should be based on the broadest possible agreement among UN member 
States»192, while keeping the status of the permanent members and their immutable right to veto 
intact. For Russia, countries willing to change the configuration of the UNSC (such as Brazil and 
India) must «understand that it is uneasy to implement such a reform and that all the structural and 
procedural changes should be made gradually and in a cautious way»193, a sign that Moscow could 
decelerate any initiatives towards a UNSC reform that runs contrary to its understanding of what 
‘cautious’ or ‘gradual’ change means.  
 
3.3 BRAZIL’S AND RUSSIA’S VISION ON WHAT BRETOON WOODS 
INSTITUTIONS REPRESENT 
 
Having managed to repay their debts to the West during early 2000s, Brazil and Russia 
raised from a position of weakness to one of confidence, inspiring politicians in both capitals to 
look for an improvement of their countries` status within the global financial architecture. In 
Brazil`s point of view, it is considered that the country could only grow economically during the 
beginning of the 21st century due to the payment of its debt to the IMF, provided it no longer had 
to accept its policies and recommendations194.  
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On a different note, while delivering a speech at the UN, the former Brazilian President 
Dilma Rousseff would also draw attention to the imperative of eliminating «the disparity between 
the growing importance of developing countries in the global economy and their insufficient 
representation and participation in the decision-making processes of international financial 
institutions»195, a position that reflected the country’s view about the situation involving the lack 
of legitimacy of the IMF and the World Bank. In effect, one of the guidelines of Brazilian foreign 
policy, among others present within its Constitution, is to narrow the gap between developed and 
developing countries196.  
Additionally, while within the frameworks of IBSA, Brazil (alongside India and South 
Africa) declared that the IMF’s reform «must effectively reduce the serious imbalance between 
the ample majority of voting power now held by advanced economies and the unsatisfactory 
participation of developing countries»197 an observation that implicitly opposes the ‘developing 
countries’ in the Global South and the ‘advanced economies’ of the Global North. IBSA countries 
indeed identify themselves as belonging to a ‘Global South community’198, corresponding to the 
peripheral (and/or semi-peripheral) regions or countries within the world capitalist economy. 
Formerly known as the Third World, countries in the Global South are loosely associated to Latin 
America, Africa and even parts of Asia, while also representing a metaphor for social exploitation 
and economic exclusion experienced throughout their historical relationship with the core 
capitalist nations of the system, or to put it simply the Global North.    
Indeed, since Lula’s government (2003-2010), Brazil reinvigorated its political 
contacts with Latin American, African and Asian countries199 on the Global South. On a practical 
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level, exemplifying the country’s proactivity in demonstrating the growing importance of 
emerging economies to global financial governance, Brazil (together with India and South Africa) 
established in 2004 the IBAS Fund to provide financial support to human development projects 
and the fight against poverty and hunger in developing countries. That project was considered by 
IBSA as a «unique initiative to enhance South-South cooperation», providing an alternative 
framework for global financial governance.  
Apart from practical initiatives of the kind discussed above, there is a common 
understanding in many States that processes of globalization contributed to the worsening in 
wealth inequality around the world, benefiting a small economic elite in developed countries in 
detriment of the developing ones200, while at the same time the cooperation received by countries 
in the Global South (be it through the IMF and otherwise), using the expression of former 
[Brazilian] Minister of Foreign Affairs Celso Amorim, was usually ‘given with one hand and taken 
away with the other’201. Southern countries, like those in Latin America and Africa, share similar 
socioeconomic and cultural characteristics and their cooperation (as within the frameworks of 
IBSA) is in essence devoid of the aspects of domination and dependence that usually characterize 
North-South relationship202, be it under the auspices of the IMF or the World Bank. 
Russia, in turn, joined the IMF and the World Bank only in 1992 after the collapse of 
the USSR, being integrated into the world’s key economic institutions led by the West203. During 
the 1990s, however, Moscow was severely dependent on Western economic help, having inherited 
all the debt of the former Soviet Union (composed by its 15 original republics), a sum estimated in 
approximately US$ 56.5 billion. It was only in 2006 that Moscow managed to pay off all of its 
debt to the West (more precisely to a group of countries known as the Paris Club204), thus achieving 
its long-desired financial independence. With confidence regained due to the country’s significant 
economic growth during early 2000s, Russian authorities started to voice their support for a 
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reorganization of global financial governance, based on claims by a bigger number of States whose 
economic emergence entitled them to play a greater role in the decision-making process205 of 
institutions such as the IMF and World Bank. Concomitantly, Russia turned into one of the main 
proponents of the need to replace the Bretton Woods system206 by a fairer, less-Western centric 
model of financial global governance.  
In comparative terms, contrary to Brazil’s paradigm of North-South relations 
embedded within the relationship between developed and developing countries, Russia interpreted 
the Bretton Woods institutions within the frameworks of an East-West divide and on the Western 
predominance/hegemony in world affairs. On this note, in early 2000s, Russia for instance 
denounced the establishment of a unipolar structure of IR based on «the economic and power 
domination of the United States»207, while in reality the West was irreversibly losing its monopoly 
due to the rising of new centers of economic/political power within the system208. On this note, in 
2013 Russia observed that global power, once within the confines of a handful of Western States, 
became «more dispersed and […] [while] shifting to the East, [and] primarily to the Asia-Pacific 
region»209, a trend that alluded to the growing economic [as well as political] importance of Asia 
in international affairs, culminating in the erosion of the traditional dominance of the West210. 
In that vein, while Brazil favored, prior to BRICS, political associations such as IBSA 
that worked within the frameworks of the Global South, at the same time identifying the West and 
Western-tailored institutions (Bretton Woods included) as representatives of the Global North, 
Russia, on the other hand, preferred to strengthen its ties with Asian countries (especially China) 
at the beginning of the 2000s in order to counterpoise the Western hegemony in world affairs 
(again embedded within organizations such as the IMF and World Bank), within a more familiar 
- to Moscow - framework of an East-West divide. All those nuances in views and positions upheld 
by both Brazil and Russia discussed in Chapter 3 demonstrate that, although participants of 
BRICS, each country has its own way of interpreting the topics of common concern for the group.        
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BRICS’ VIEWS VIS-À-VIS BRAZIL’S AND RUSSIA’S POSITION 
 
BRICS is a group whose inception was highly motivated by a desire to provide a 
counterbalance to Western (and ultimately American) hegemonism in international affairs. On a 
global perspective, today’s prevailing order is «focused on establishing and promoting alternatives 
to the U.S.-led and Western dominated»211 institutions of governance, while, in the words of 
former Brazilian president Michel Temer, the world is in need of «more legitimate and effective 
international decision-making bodies»212 to better represent the increasing importance of emerging 
economies (as those represented by BRICS prior to its inception).  
However, there are some important political nuances when it comes to the BRICS 
positioning on relevant aspects of global governance in comparison to the national perspectives of 
its member countries. The current thesis, therefore, aimed to present an overview of how BRICS 
statements (analyzed in Chapter 2) on the current problems surrounding international mechanisms 
of global governance, mainly those established right after World War II (as discussed in Chapter 
1) and surviving to this day, could slightly differ from Brazil’s and Russia’s individual 
interpretations and views on those same problems (as seen in Chapter 3).  
As a starting point about how BRICS interpretations could slightly differ from each 
member-country’s view about common principles of international life, we could mention the 
different nuances given by the group, as well as by both Brazil and Russia individually, to aspects 
such as the importance of ‘Multilateralism’ in world affairs and the meaning of ‘Multipolarity’. 
BRICS underlines the relevance of multilateral diplomacy in IR as a means to oppose American 
and/or Western unilateralism in solving acute problems that should, instead, be handled by 
peaceful and diplomatic means. Meanwhile, the group interprets the rise of multipolarity as a 
process captained mainly by emerging [economic] powers.  
Brazil, for its part, sees multilateralism as a means to mitigate Great Power politics 
(once the country does not have the material attributes to qualify as a Great Power), while 
promoting multipolarity as a ‘democratization’ of world politics and placing especial emphasis to 
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South America’ role in a multipolar world, and not only of Brazil in particular. Russia, on the other 
hand, while endowed with the attributes of a Great Power (represented by its military might and 
nuclear-State status), sees itself as one of the necessary poles of a multipolar world, whereas 
‘multilateralism’ in Russian official documents is regularly associated with the importance of the 
UN and especially the Security Council’ role in solving acute problems of international life, 
something to be expected given the country’s position as its permanent member.  
Speaking about the Security Council, whereas BRICS indeed considers its reform as a 
necessary step (within a broader UN reform to be undertaken), so far only Brazil and India are 
more actively pushing for a fundamental redistribution of powers within that mechanism, while 
Russia and China feel ‘essentially reluctant’ towards hastened modifications in the status-quo213. 
As argued by a Brazilian diplomat, while endowed with a privileged position in the UN 
institutional structure, Russia (as well as China) «will not approve any change affecting such a 
prominent position»214, thus representing an obstacle to an urgent expansion of UNSC’s permanent 
membership. IR Theory, by its turn, could be punctually used to helps us explain this difference 
in views.  
According to IR Theory, States are usually classified as being either status-quo, 
revisionist or reformist powers; Status-quo powers are generally associated with States whose 
main concern is to maintain their position/privileges/prerogatives in the system; meanwhile, States 
dissatisfied with their place in world affairs are often labelled revisionists, willing to change, in a 
significant and sometimes radical way, the rules and norms that govern the system to their own 
benefit; whereas reformist powers, albeit also dissatisfied with their place in the overall scheme of 
things (as revisionist States do), prefer to act on the basis of existing rules/norms, once advocating 
for gradual reform through negotiations and diplomatic means215.  
BRICS declarations regarding the Security Council can be considered as reformist in 
essence, albeit vague in substance, whereas Russia’s individual position on the matter best fits the 
category of a status-quo power, in contrast to Brazil’s more reformist approach. BRICS recognizes 
the need to reform the Security Council, although in its declarations the group does not explicitly 
mentions the bids of Brazil (and India) for permanent membership of that mechanism. Brazil, on 
the one hand, does not contest the rules and norms surrounding the Council’s operation and it is 
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worth noting that both the G4’s as well as IBSA’s proposals for the addition of new members to 
the UNSC does not involve suppression of veto power from the Big Five, nor does it suggest that 
the new members be given veto power right after their acceptance216. As things stand, the UNSC 
continues to alienate a great number of countries in the international community, representing an 
outdated configuration of power that dates back to the aftermath of World War II. Russia, by its 
turn, even though considering the addition of new permanent members to the Council as an 
important step in reforming that institution, is unwilling to proceed and/or support any major 
hastened changes at the Council.  
In the case of Bretton Woods institutions, BRICS, for its part, criticizes its excessive 
“Westerness”, manifested for instance by the selection process for the Heads of the IMF and the 
World Bank, as well as the lack of sufficient representation/Voting Power held by emerging 
economies vis-à-vis the G7. With the establishment of the New Development Bank in 2015, 
BRICS expected moreover «to influence the international financial architecture and global 
practices by being a fundamentally new kind of development institution based on mutual respect 
and reflecting the evolution of the world economy in recent decades»217, based on the increasing 
role of emerging economies218. 
Another point of contention and criticism towards Bretton Woods institutions regards 
the policy recommendations of the IMF to borrowing countries. Under the auspices of the IMF, 
borrowing States have to fulfill certain requirements and criteria established by the Fund, which 
sometimes involves the adoption of harsh austerity economic measures. Brazilian authorities, in 
particular, hold unpleasant memories about the times the country was indebted to the Fund, while 
Russia, on the other hand, also experienced a difficult situation of economic dependence in relation 
to the West during the 1990s, while transitioning from its previously [Soviet] State-led economy 
to a market-oriented one.  
Within the 2000s, both Brazil and Russia managed to repay their debts, subsequently 
forming the BRICS group in order to counterbalance the Western over-influence in international 
affairs, especially represented by the latter’s privileged position at the Bretton Woods 
organizations. For Brazil, in particular, the IMF and the World Bank should provide a bigger voice 
 
216 Sloboda, P.M; Val, E.M. Revisitando o Novo Multilateralismo Latino-Americano e seu Impacto na Reforma do 
Conselho De Segurança Das Nações Unidas 
217 NEW DEVELOPMENT BANK (2017). NDB’s General Strategy: 2017 – 2021. URL: <https://www.ndb.int/wp-
content/uploads/2017/08/NDB-Strategy.pdf>, p.26 
218 NDB promises “a new mindset of partnership”, engaging “in a dialogue of equals” with its borrowers and putting 
the recipient countries in “charge” of their development projects. NDB also promises to be a non-prescriptive 




and representation to developing economies in managing global financial governance, and the 
country holds (as demonstrated by political discourse and documents) an interpretation of those 
institutions within a South-North framework, whereas the North is comprised by advanced 
capitalist economies whose historical dominance jeopardize the development of countries 
pertaining to the Global South, generally associated with Latin America, Africa and parts of Asia. 
Russia, on the other hand, pointed out, in its Foreign Policy Concepts, to attempts by 
Western States to hold on to its hegemonic position in international relations (represented for 
instance by the privileges enjoyed by the US and its allies at Bretton Woods institutions), while 
interpreting the ‘Western’ decline in terms of legitimacy and authority in world affairs within an 
East-West divide. Russia, therefore, joined forces with countries such as India and (especially) 
China during the 2000s in order to better counterpoise the West and strengthened its political ties 
with the East through bilateral, trilateral (as in the case of the RIC group) and plurilateral 
initiatives.  
To sum up, after all the discussions here presented, expectations are that the current 
thesis might have provided some necessary as well as relevant insight into how Brazil’s and 
Russia’s positioning within BRICS interrelates with, and in some aspects slightly differentiate 
from, global and, especially, national perspectives on important topics associated to global 
governance. We, nevertheless, recognize that the present work has a number of limitations. 
Firstly, the use of political discourse from different leaders as representing the official position of 
a State on any given issue of IR, albeit analytically useful, can sometimes constitute an abstract 
extrapolation of reality. Secondly, not always what is written in official documents (be it 
intentions, aspirations, aims), as well as in different primary sources extensively used throughout 
this work, can be implemented in practice. Finally, the lack of clear definition regarding some 
terms and concepts used by BRICS, as well as by Brazil and Russia individually, sometimes 
hinders the comparative approach undertaken by our research.  
We also point out to the necessity of further research regarding the prospects for 
‘Brazil-Russia political relations’ within and outside BRICS, considering Brazil’s new foreign 
policy orientation implemented by Jair Bolsonaro’s government. As observed elsewhere, «changes 
in domestic politics [in any of the member-States] may limit the development of the BRICS 
association»219, and Brazil’s current political instability does bring concern to all of the remaining 
BRICS members.  
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In effect, contrary to Brazil’s diplomatic traditions of privileging multilateral solutions 
to global problems, Jair Bolsonaro’s government places emphasis on bilateralism220 in order to 
promote the country’s national interests. Moreover, Bolsonaro’s ideological like-mindedness with 
[the US President Donald] Trump seats uneasily with BRICS’s support for a more democratic and 
multipolar world order. Russia, by its turn, rightfully observed  the importance of «a firm political 
will on the part of [the] governments of the participating States to deepen [BRICS] 
cooperation»221, requiring that all BRICS countries work in unison to the consecution of their 
shared objectives and goals.  
Nevertheless, however uncertain the prospects for Brazilian-Russian cooperation may 
be in the foreseeable future, the author of this thesis expects that both countries continue to work 
productively based on a principled relationship, and regardless of the difference in views on certain 
aspects of global governance previously discussed, not only through BRICS but also in a wider 
range of international fora. To this end, Russia’s promise (made in 2008) to «establish a strategic 
partnership with Brazil»222 should be fully implemented, not only within the frameworks of 
BRICS, but also by strengthening their contacts in another spheres as well, such as commerce, 
cultural/humanitarian exchange, tourism, scientific and technological cooperation, education, etc. 
However, a certain disappointment arises from the fact that Brazil was barely mentioned in 
Russia’s most recent Foreign Policy Concept of 2016, demonstrating that there is still a long way 
to go for both countries to consolidate their full potential of cooperation. Nevertheless, 
optimistically the continuous political interaction between Brazil and Russia within BRICS can 
still provide future opportunities for a more creative bilateral exchange, once, as stated by former 
Brazilian president Fernando Henrique Cardoso «the imagination of our peoples is as vast as the 
spaces that they inhabit»223, regardless of how distant we are situated in the world map. 
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Figure 1 – Josef Stalin, Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill at the Yalta Conference 
(The dawn of the formulation of the Post-War international order. The Soviet Union, the United 
States and Great Britain would afterwards become permanent members of the Security Council)  
SOURCE: AFP 
  
Figure 2 – International delegation of economic experts at Bretton Woods (US) in 1944 
(Bretton Woods would give birth to institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, the pillars of 





Figure 3 – First BRIC Summit in Yekaterinburg (Russia) in 2009 
(After the Financial Crisis, BRIC countries would get together to voice their dissatisfaction with 




       
SOURCE: The Guardian 
  
Figure 4 – Last BRICS Summit in Brasilia (Brazil) in 2019 
(Jair Bolsonaro, Brazil’s new President elected in 2018, would host his first BRICS Summit in 









Figure 5 – G4 Meeting of Heads of State in 2015  
(During the Labor Party’s years of government [2003-2016], Brazil used political associations 











Figure 6 – Vladimir Putin during the Munich Conference on International Security in 2007 
(In the opportunity, the Russian president would lay down a harsh criticism against Unipolarity 











% OF UNSC SEATS/UN 
MEMBERS 
1945 51 11 21% 
1965 117 15 13%  
2019 193 15 8% 
        SOURCE: United Nations. URL: <https://www.un.org/en/sections/member-states/growth-
united-nations-membership-1945-present/index.html#1960s> 
 
Table II – G4 Meetings 
 
Meetings Date 
G4 Meeting of the Foreign Ministers - New York September 21, 2017 
G4 Meeting of the Foreign Ministers - New York September 21, 2016 
G4 Ministerial Meeting - New York July 11, 2016 
G4 Meeting of the Leaders – New York September 26, 2015 
G4 Ministerial Meeting – New York July 04, 2014 
G4 Ministerial Meeting – New York September 25, 2012 
G4 Ministerial Meeting - New York September 25, 2012 
G4 Ministerial Meeting – New York February 11, 2011 
    SOURCE: (Brazilian) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018 
 
Brazil’s Years of Membership at the Security Council:  
1946 to 1947 
1951 to 1952 
1954 to 1955 
1963 to 1964 
1967 to 1968 
1988 to 1989 
1993 to 1994 
1998 to 1999 
2004 to 2005 
2010 to 2011 













Place in World 
Economy (GDP) 
Place in World 









US 17.46 16.52 1  
(20.5 trillion USD) 
2  
(20.5 trillion USD) 
23,8 15.2 
Japan  6.48 6.15 3  
(4.97 trillion USD) 
4  
(5.6 trillion USD) 
5.79 4.16 
China 6.41 6.09 2  
(13.6 trillion USD) 
1  
(25.3 trillion USD) 
15.85 18.7 
Germany 5.60 5.32 4  
(3.99 trillion USD) 
5  
(4.37 trillion USD) 
4.65 3.24 
France 4.24 4.03 6  
(2.77 trillion USD) 
10  




4.24 4.03 5  
(2.82 trillion USD) 
9  
(3 trillion USD) 
3.29 2.24 
Italy 3.17 3.02 8  
(2 trillion USD) 
12  
(2.39 trillion USD) 
2.41 1.77 
India  2.76 2.64 7  
(2.72 trillion USD) 
3  
(10.4 trillion USD) 
3.17 7.69 
Russia 2.71 2.59 11  
(1.65 trillion USD) 
6  
(4.17 trillion USD) 
1.93 3.09 
Brazil 2.32 2.22 9  
(1.86 trillion USD) 
8  
(3.37 trillion USD) 
2.17 2.49 
Canada 2.32 2.2 10  
(1.71 trillion USD) 
17  
(1.85 trillion USD) 
1.99 1.37 
*Purchasing Power Parity                
SOURCES: IMF, URL: <https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/eds.aspx> - World Bank, URL: 






















Nominal GDP  
 








G7  43.51 41.27  (38.76 trillion USD)  40.67 trillion 
USD 
45.16 30.18 
BRIC 14.2 13.54  (19.83 trillion USD) 43.24 trillion USD 23.12 31.97 
*Purchasing Power Parity/SOURCES: IMF, World Bank, Statisticstimes. Table elaborated by the author 
 






(% OF TOTAL) 
VOTING RIGHTS 
(% OF TOTAL) 
 BRAZIL 100,000 20 20 
 RUSSIA 100,000 20 20 
 INDIA 100,000 20 20 
 CHINA 100,000 20 20 
 SOUTH AFRICA 100,000 20 20 
SOURCE: NDB, URL: <https://www.ndb.int/about-us/organisation/members/> 
 
Table VI – BRICS countries’ voting rights at NDB if based on each State’s GDP (as of 2018) 
COUNTRIES GDP Simulated Voting Rights 
Based on GDP 
China $13.41 trillion 67% 
India $2.72 trillion 13.6% 
Brazil $1.87 trillion 9.35% 
Russia $1.63 trillion 8.15% 
South Africa $ 0.36 trillion 1.8% 
                  SOURCE: Elaborated by the author 
 
